Between 1995 and 2018, just over half of the U.S. states enacted laws requiring private insurance plans cover medical care provided remotely using various technologies. These telemedicine parity laws likely increase health care access, particularly in areas with few providers, by granting patients access to specialists or primary care providers located elsewhere. The effect of these laws on health outcomes is ambiguous. We estimate the effect of telemedicine parity laws on mortality rates of all causes and for causes of death due to conditions more frequently treated with telemedicine. We find declines in mortality rates post-parity laws, driven by decreases in ischemic heart disease deaths. Our results suggest that relaxing current telemedicine regulations in programs such as Medicare might improve patient outcomes.
Introduction
Technological progress drives economic growth through increased productivity and lower costs. In the health care industry, one recent technological innovation is the use of telemedicine. Telemedicine refers to four types of activities: the use of realtime video communication between a patient and provider, transmitting images to medical specialists, remote patient monitoring, and, sometimes, mobile health apps (NCSL 2015, p8) . Telemedicine does not refer to standard uses of facsimile machines, email, or the telephone.
Case studies by the American Telemedicine Association (2018) include examples such as medication monitoring programs, videoed doctor visits that patients can watch repeatedly, and telemedicine carts allowing patients in more rural settings to access specialists located in more urban settings. Specialists making use of telemedicine frequently include dermatologists, neurologists, acute care providers such as with telestroke programs, and psychiatrists (Institute of Medicine 2015) . A meta-analysis of 93 randomized controlled trials of telemedicine compared to usual care found similar or somewhat better health outcomes for patients treated via telemedicine (Flodgren et al. 2015) .
State legislatures continue to update their medical care policies in response to changing technology. In particular, many states have adopted telemedicine parity laws. Telemedicine parity laws require Medicaid, private health insurance plans, or both to cover telemedicine services to the same extent as in-person services. The term 'parity' in the mandate refers to a requirement of equal coverage for telemedicine and face-to-face medical care. Advocates frequently cite reimbursement concerns as one factor limiting adoption of telemedicine (Yang 2016; Dorsey and Topol 2016) . They argue that parity laws support a nascent industry, encouraging investment in infrastructure and training. Opponents of parity laws argue that the lower costs of telemedicine, the potential for gaps in care or medical records, and privacy concerns do not warrant equal reimbursement for these services.
We consider whether telemedicine parity laws affect patient outcomes, specifically mortality rates. We provide complementary analysis to Grecu and Sharma (2018) who find that telemedicine parity laws reduce delayed routine check-ups and decrease hospital utilization rates in urban, non-metropolitan areas. Their results suggest that telemedicine parity laws may not increase costs.
We add to the literature by demonstrating improvements in patient outcomes due to telemedicine parity laws. We estimate the effect of telemedicine parity laws on 2 mortality rates for a variety of causes of death. We choose causes of death due to conditions more likely to be treated using telemedicine (Deschenes 2012; Parmar et al. 2015) . Specifically, we examine mortality rates separately for all causes, for cerebrovascular diseases, diabetes mellitus, influenza and pneumonia, ischemic heart disease, and suicide.
Using event study and difference-in-differences estimation, we find declines in mortality rates following the passage of telemedicine parity laws, driven by decreases in the death rate due to ischemic heart disease. The results are robust to a variety of alternative specifications and falsification tests, supporting a causal interpretation.
The implied mechanism for the declines in mortality is improved medical care due to the mandate. Telemedicine likely impacts an area more when access to primary care providers and specialists is more limited and when the area has fewer uninsured residents and more broadband access. We consider potential evidence in support of this mechanism by allowing the effects of parity laws to differ based on an area's level of urbanization. We find larger effects of these mandates in the urban fringe, areas that tend to have fewer uninsured residents and more broadband access. We also demonstrate that the parity laws reduce hospital utilizations, consistent with Grecu and Sharma (2018) .
Background of Telemedicine and Telemedicine Parity Laws
The American Telemedicine Association estimates that as many as 15 million people used telemedicine services in 2015 (Gumpert 2015) . Telemedicine encompasses a wide-range of technologies and uses. The Center for Connected Health Policy (2018) provides some examples. The four primary technologies include video conferencing, store-and-forward, remote patient monitoring, and mobile health. Common video conferencing purposes include health education, ICU monitoring programs, and consultations between specialists that may not otherwise be available and physicians and patients. For example, video conferencing allows hospitals with limited behavioral health specialists to connect patients with a specialist in another location; this use of telemedicine is particularly valuable in cases of substance abusers and those with acute mental health disorders that may lead to suicide. Store-andforward allows physicians to send medical images to a specialist for analysis; typically, these specialists include radiologists, pathologists, dermatologists, and oph-3
thalmologists. Remote patient monitoring includes, for example, implantable cardiac devices that wirelessly report data to a clinic and remote monitoring of blood sugar, blood pressure, and other health data. Patients with ischemic heart disease, cerebrovascular diseases, and diabetes may find this monitoring particularly valuable. Mobile health technology uses smart phones and other portable devices for patients to record compliance with prescription regimes, manage diets, and regularly report symptoms. Diabetic patients and others with chronic health conditions may value these alternative methods of medical care. The arm's length care provided by telemedicine services may also reduce the spread of contagious illnesses such as influenza and pneumonia. All private parity laws require private insurance plans to cover telemedicine services. Although many of these laws are silent as to reimbursement rates, some require similar reimbursement rates. 2 For example, Texas's legislation reads:
A health benefit plan may not exclude a service from coverage under the plan solely because the service is provided through telemedicine and not provided through a face to face consultation.
(b) Benefits for a service provided through telemedicine required under this article may be made subject to a deductible, copayment, or coinsurance requirement. A deductible, copayment, or coinsurance applicable to a particular service provided through telemedicine may not exceed the deductible, copayment, or coinsurance required by the health benefit plan for the same service provided through a face to face consultation.
1 For detailed policy dates, see Appendix Table A.1 2 Although Minnesota's law passed too recently to be in our sample, its legislation requires telemedicine to be reimbursed "on the same basis and at the same rate as the health carrier would apply to those services if the services had been delivered in person". Only a few states have explicit payment parity mandates.
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Similarly, Indiana's requires that "Coverage for telemedicine services…may not be subject to a dollar limit, deductible, or coinsurance requirement that is less favorable to a covered individual than the dollar limit, deductible, or coinsurance requirement that applies to the same health care services delivered to a covered individual in person." Georgia's telemedicine law, however, only requires coverage of telemedicine and is silent on reimbursement and copayment rates.
Like most private insurance mandates, telemedicine parity laws apply to private insurance plans that are not self-insured and, as such, explicitly cover a decreasing fraction of the population. The percentage of people aged less than 65 with private health insurance through their employer has declined from 68 percent in 1999 to 57 percent in 2015 (Cohen 2017) . Of these, the percent covered by self-funded plans has increased from 44 percent in 1999 to 63 percent in 2015 (Claxton et al. 2015) . This translates to a decline from 38 to 21 percent of those less than 65 covered by state insurance mandates.
Although insurance mandates target only a minority of the population, telemedicine parity laws likely result in broader adoptions of telemedicine within a state. Once the infrastructure is laid out, providers may extend telemedicine options to patients covered by self-insured or government-provided plans as well as uninsured patients. We observe self-insured plans offering telemedicine services (Restrepo 2017). Further, in many states, the private insurance parity law was passed alongside the parity expectation for Medicaid.
Medicare only covers synchronous services where the patient is present in a health care facility located in a limited, defined set of geographic locations (Yang 2016) . These conditions include that the beneficiary is at an originating site that is in a designated rural health professional shortage area, not in a Metropolitan Area county, or participating in a Federal telemedicine demonstration project. The Medicare Telehealth Parity Act of 2017 sought to expand the covered set of conditions to allow broader use of telemedicine in the U.S.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature that examines the utilization and health effects of various forms of state-level legislative actions in regulating health insurance plans. Most evaluations focus on provisions that requires specific treatments to be covered, including cancer screening (for example, Bitler and Carpenter 2016; Hamman and Kapinos 2016; Xu, Dowd, and Abraham 2016) , childhood vaccines (Chang 2016) , contraceptive services (Mulligan 2015; Dills and Grecu 2017) , mental health services and substance abuse treatments (Dave and Mukerjee 2011; Harris, Carpenter, and Bao 2006; Lang 2013; Klick and Markowitz 2006; Pacula and Sturm 2000) , minimum length-of-stay for newborns (Almond and Doyle 2011; Evans and Garthwaite 2012) , services for autism spectrum disorders (Chatterji, Decker, and Markowitz 2015) , and use of assisted reproductive technologies and other infertility treatments (Bitler and Schmidt 2012; Buckles 2013; Bundorf, Henne, and Baker 2007; Hamilton and McManus 2012; Schmidt 2007 ).
More generally, insurance benefit mandates raise premiums (Bailey 2014) and push patients from employer-sponsored insurance into public insurance plans (Li and Ye 2017) . Telemedicine parity laws are distinct from other benefit mandates in that they expand traditional delivery methods. These new delivery methods likely increase access for the previously underserved population. In cases such as disease management or for patients with mobility issues, telemedicine might provide better care compared to in-person services. There is limited research that studies the impact of state telemedicine parity laws. Grecu and Sharma (2018) find that state telemedicine mandates increase routine check-ups and decrease inpatient days and surgeries in urban areas. We build on these findings by estimating the net effect of these mandates on health outcomes.
Research Design and Data
Research Design
Our main research design relies on within-state variations in the effective dates of parity laws. We start by defining the treatment status of a given state solely based on the existence of private parity laws. In fact, relatively fewer Medicaid parity policies were adopted during the analysis period, and their effective dates tend to overlap with the dates of private parity policies.
The outcome considered, mortality rates by cause of death, are available from 1999 to 2016. We are not able to consider policy changes before 1999 or after 2016. The sample window excludes four states with effective dates prior to 1999 from the analysis: California (1997), Louisiana (1995 ), Oklahoma (1997 ), and Texas (1997 . Another five states adopt parity policies in 2017 : Nebraska (2017 ), New Jersey (2017 ), North Dakota (2017 ), Rhode Island (2018 ), and Washington (2017 . We categorize these later adopting states as "never treated states".
We evaluate the policy impacts using an event-study framework. To have a sufficient window of periods for evaluating pre-and post-policy estimates, we require treated states to have at least four pre-policy years and three years of post-period. These requirements restrict the analysis to fourteen states, shown in Table 1 .
We measure the impact of Telemedicine parity laws by exploiting the fact that states enact these laws in different years. Specifically, we first estimate the following difference-in-differences (DD) regression:
where the dependent variable is the logged cause-specific mortality rate in county c and year t, and the key explanatory variable of interest is an indicator for the adoption of private telemedicine parity laws at the state-year (st) level. In equation (1), county fixed effects (β c ) control for differences in means of the log mortality rate across county and year fixed effects (δ t ) control for the overall mortality trend common to all counties. Time-varying county-level covariates X ct control for characteristics of the county changing over time including the unemployment rate, poverty rate, and provider densities. We cluster the regression standard errors at the statelevel to allow for arbitrary correlation in the error term across time and counties within a state.
The parameter ρ in equation (1) provides an unbiased estimate of the intent to treat effect of telemedicine parity laws if the counterfactual trends of mortality rates in treated counties can be reasonably approximated by mortality trends in comparison counties. This common trend assumption cannot be verified directly.
To examine visually the common trend assumption for identification, we conduct event studies of mortality rates around the years when states adopt parity policies. For these event studies, we augment equation (1) by regressing the mortality rates on indicators for leads and lags of the policy years:
where (Parity Law) In regression (2), the parameters ρ −l , ρ −l+1 , · · · , ρ −1 measures the deviation of mortality rates from the trends prior to the adoption of parity laws, and they serve as a form of falsification test. A valid common trend assumption would suggest that all pre-treatment estimates (ρ −l ,ρ −l+1 , · · · ,ρ −1 ) are close to zero. The parameters ρ 1 , · · · , ρ L measure the post-treatment effects, and they help to reveal, if present, treatment effect heterogeneity across time. We impose an endpoint restriction such
In other words, we pool the first dummy to include periods 3 or more years before the policy, and the last dummy to include periods 3 or more years after the policy.
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The staggered adoption of policy implicitly gives rise to two comparison groups: counties that are not yet treated and counties that are never treated in the sample years. The validity of the DD estimates of ρ depends on the quality of these two comparison groups. The event study framework helps to clarify the underlying comparisons. If we estimate equation (1) using only the treated states, we compare the changes in mortality of the treated counties to those counties that have not yet been treated. Adding the never treated states to the analysis sample compares the changes in a county's mortality post-treatment to the changes in the not-yet-treated counties as well as the never treated counties.
The choice of the preferred comparison group relies on the comparability of the treated and control groups. A good control group provides a reasonable counterfactual for what would have happened in the treated states had they not passed the mandate. One test of the validity of the counterfactual comes via tests of pre-treatment trends in the residualized outcomes. The residualized mortality rates control for county fixed effects, overall year fixed effects, and the influences of observed, timevarying county covariates.
In practice, we find that the two comparison groups are not exchangeable: estimates using only the treated states are largely valid, whereas estimates including the never treated groups are not. To emphasize the source of identification, we always report the regression estimates using (1) a sample of the treated states only, and (2) a sample of both the treated states and never treated states. When we include both the treated and never-treated states, we allow the year fixed effects to differ for the two comparison groups. The second analysis sample contributes variations in the control variables and helps to alleviate the concern that the number of clusters are not large enough for computing proper clustered robust standard errors.
To further enhance the plausibility of the intention-to-treat effects, we carry out a series of robustness checks. First, we include state-specific linear time trends to the generic estimating regression, which helps to rule out the possibility that mortality rates follow state-specific linear changes that could be correlated with the adoption of parity laws. This allows, for example, for the possibility that states responded to a rise in certain mortality trends by passing telemedicine parity mandates. While we view the specification with state trends as an exercise for demonstrating the robustness of the main estimates, we note that they are also valid research designs with different identification assumptions (Mora and Reggio 2017) . Second, we perform falsification tests by examining mortality rates of accidents (transport and nontransport) and homicide. Such outcomes are unlikely to be affected by telemedicine services. Finding close-to-zero estimates of the effect of telemedicine laws on these death rates lends support for our research design. Third, our main analysis sample is an unbalanced county-year panel because of data limitations. As a sensitivity analysis, we re-estimate our main regressions on two alternative samples: a balanced county-year panel and a balanced state-year panel dataset.
We posit that the mechanism by which telemedicine mandates lower mortality rates is by increasing access to medical care. To verify this mechanism, we explore whether the effects of telemedicine laws differ by geographic area. We may expect smaller impacts of these laws in areas where there is more limited broadband access, a less insured populace, or already greater access to providers. We discuss the definition of subareas in the next subsection. As another way to understand the mechanism, we examine whether the parity laws impact population health or substitute for ordinary forms of care by analyzing data on several measures of hospital utilizations.
Data
Our primary dataset comes from the vital statistics compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2017) . We obtain the data from the CDC's pub-licly available WONDER online database. The data allow us to examine overall and cause-specific mortality rates at various levels of geography. We conduct the central analysis at the level of county and year because it allows us to flexibly control for county covariates. In supporting specifications, we aggregate the county-level data to larger geographic regions.
One limitation of the data is that the CDC suppresses death counts below ten. We exclude the missing county-year observations, leading to an unbalanced panel dataset. The suppression creates little problem for more common causes of death or for larger counties. Still, the suppression excludes less populated counties, where the gains from the adoption of telemedicine services could potentially be larger. Because the CDC's WONDER system provides full counts of death at the level of state and year, we also report estimates from a state-year panel. Table 2 presents summary statistics of the mortality rates and a set of control variables we gather from various sources (see table notes for details). For comparison, Column 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the never treated states. Columns 2 and 3 split the sample by years prior to or after the enactment of private parity laws. Column 4 provides the same statistics for the treated states across all the sample years.
Overall, mortality rates among treated states are lower in the post-policy period, and states without telemedicine parity mandates tend to have higher mortality rates for all causes and most of the specific causes. Interestingly, counties in treated states have a lower population density and provider density, which are features that suggest greater potentials for improvements from telemedicine technologies. As for economic indicators, median household income is about 2 percent lower in never treated states, though their poverty rates are also lower by about 1 percentage point. We control for these time-varying characteristics -population, provider density, median household income, and poverty rates-in the regression analysis.
For the subarea analysis, we select the 2013 Urban-Rural Classification Scheme developed by the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS). The scheme divides counties into two main categories and six levels. The two main categories are metropolitan and non-metropolitan. The metropolitan category includes four geographic levels: large central metro (counties of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) of 1 million or more population with a central city), large fringe metro (counties of MSAs of 1 million or more population), medium metro (counties within MSAs of 250,000 to 999,999 population), and small metro (counties within MSAs of 50,000 to 249,999 population). The nonmetropolitan category includes Results two geographic levels: micropolitan (counties in micropolitan statistical areas), and noncore (counties not within micropolitan statistical areas). 4 To simplify the number of subarea analyses, we combine the two levels of medium and small metro counties as well as the two nonmetropolitan levels.
One advantage of the classification scheme is the separation of the central and fringe metro counties. The median population density in fringe metro counties is about 10 times lower than that in central metro counties, making fringe metro counties more suitable to embrace telemedicine services. Moreover, residents in the two regions, as concluded by a NCHS report (Ingram and Franco 2014) , "differed substantially on many health measures". For example, an important difference for the context of our study is that residents in large fringe metro counties tend to have the highest rate of insurance coverage.
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Results
Difference-in-Differences Estimates
We first estimate equation (1) using the sample of fourteen states adopting private telemedicine parity laws between 2003 and 2014. Limiting the sample to the evertreated states identifies the effect of the law using the timing of the law's passage. Panel A of Table 3 reports the estimates from this difference-in-differences specification. We also report pre-policy means (in log and in level) of each dependent variable. Column 1 suggests that, relative to comparison counties, the all causes mortality rate declines by about 0.5 percent with a standard error of 0.3 percent.
The next five columns report the estimated effects on cause-specific death rates. We observe that the parity laws are associated with about 4.2 percent decrease in the mortality rate due to diabetes mellitus (column 3), about 6.0 percent decrease in the mortality rate due to ischemic heart disease (column 5), and about 3.6 percent decrease in the mortality rate due to suicide (column 6). The estimate for reduction
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in cerebrovascular disease is smaller, about 2 percent, and not statistically significant. The estimate for the death rate due to influenza and pneumonia is positive with a large standard error. We note that trends in the influenza and pneumonia mortality rates tend to be area-specific and year fixed effects do not adequately control for the temporal patterns, preventing a valid counterfactual group. Panel B of Table 3 includes a larger set of control states and allows the year fixed effects to differ for treated and never-treated counties. Estimates and standard errors using this larger sample are similar to those presented in Panel A. Overall, the results suggest declines in mortality stemming from mandates to cover telemedicine.
Event-Study Estimates
We estimate the event study specification from equation (2) using the same two samples. The first sample comprises the fourteen treated states with at least four pre-treatment years and three post-treatment years. The second sample comprises these fourteen treated states and the never treated states; when we use this sample, we allow the year fixed effects to differ by group. Restricting the sample to the evertreated states compares mortality outcomes among states that are arguably more similar than never treated states. Figure 3 plots the relationship between parity laws and the aggregate mortality rates (top-left panel) and causes of death plausibly affected by the penetration of telemedicine services. The effects on most mortality rates are close to zero in the pretreatment period. The pattern suggests that, despite the varying policy timing, the mortality outcomes at the county level are trending similarly prior to the effective year of the parity policies. Tests of joint significance for the pre-event coefficients fail to reject the hypothesis that these coefficients are zero; these tests support the common trend assumption underlying the difference-in-differences estimation.
Moreover, the treated counties appear to experience declines post-law in the mortality rates due to diabetes, ischemic heart disease, and suicide. These results are consistent with the difference-in-differences estimates from Panel A of Table 3 . Appendix Table A .2 reports the point estimates of the event studies in Figure 3 along with the p-values from joint tests of pre-event coefficients.
Event study estimates using the larger sample of treated and never-treated states also are similar to the DD estimates reported in Panel B of Table 3 . We present these event study estimates in Appendix 
Robustness of Estimates
So far, we have shown that mortality rates fell after the passage of parity laws relative to the comparison groups. We now explore the robustness of the estimates based on alternative specifications and samples.
First, we include state-specific linear time trends; we present these results in Table  4 . Most of the point estimates are of similar magnitudes as those in Table 3 . Ten out of the twelve standard errors decrease somewhat. It's reassuring to see that the average decline in the mortality rate associated with adopting a parity law can be distinguished from a linear time trend. The results of all causes mortality effects, about -0.6 percent, are now more precisely estimated with a standard error of about 0.2 or 0.3 percent in both panels. The stability of the DD estimates reduces potential concerns about specification errors.
Next, we investigate whether the parity mandates affect outcomes that are unlikely to be related to telemedicine services. Two natural candidate causes of death are accidents and homicide. We also disaggregate accident mortality rates into transportrelated and non-transport-related. Results of the falsification tests are displayed in Table 5 . There is little evidence that parity laws lead to noticeable reduction in the placebo outcomes. Point estimates are of mixed signs and never statistically significant. These estimates on placebo outcomes provides more assurance for the causal interpretation of the primary DD estimates.
Our main analysis sample excludes some county-year observations owing to data restrictions where mortality rates are suppressed if the annual death count is between one and ten. Most of the suppressed county-years are counties with a small population. Because we weight the regressions by county population, the missing values should not create large biases for the central results even if the suppressed values occur in a non-random way. To explore this directly, we re-estimate the main DD specification on two balanced samples. First, we fully exclude any county that has at least one missing value. Panel A and B of Appendix Table A .4 present the estimates. As another alternative sample, we use state-year observations for the mortality rates. These observations include all counties within a state. We aggregate the county covariates to the state-year level, weighted by county population.
Results
Panels C and D present these results. Most of the estimates do not change much from the DD estimates presented in Table 3 .
Evidence on the Mechanism
The difference-in-differences estimates in Table 3 and the event-study estimates in Figure 3 indicate that state parity laws are associated with reductions in mortality rates. The potential mechanism for the observed effects is that parity laws triggered adoption of telemedicine services and improved population health. It is difficult to assess the extent to which providers adopted such services because common health surveys such as the National Health Interview Survey, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, and the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System do not contain telemedicine-related questions in the timeframe of our study. Code-level claim data from private insurance companies can provide a detailed picture of telemedicine utilization, but such data are proprietary.
While we cannot directly measure the prevalence of telemedicine services in treatment states due to data limitations, we provide some supporting analysis on the mechanism. We conduct the reduced form analyses at different geographic regions to demonstrate heterogeneous effects. We also examine usual forms of health care usage for evidence on whether parity laws causally improved population health or whether the new telemedicine services substitute away from in-person services.
One intention behind telemedicine is to provide additional treatment access to patients in areas with limited access to providers or specialists. To capture whether the effects of telemedicine differ for types of locations, we stratify the sample by the urbanization of the county. The categories are: counties located in the central of a large metropolitan area, on the fringe of a large metropolitan area, in medium or small metropolitan areas, and in nonmetropolitan areas. Each observation in this analysis is at the category-state-year level. For example, one observation is nonmetropolitan Maine counties in 2000.
We focus on the three outcome variables demonstrating impacts of the parity mandates in other specifications: diabetes mellitus, ischemic heart diseases, and suicide. Table 6 reports these estimates. For each of the three mortality measures, we estimate three specifications. Column 1, 4, and 7 present estimates from the same DD specifications using the sample of treated states as in Panel A of Table 3 . For some area categories, the number of treated states is less than fourteen, because not all
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states have all four area categories. Column 2, 5, and 8 use the same DD specifications as those in Panel B of Table 3 (treated and never-treated states with groupspecific year fixed effects). Lastly, in columns 3, 6, and 9, we report estimates from a specification with the larger sample and controlling for state-specific linear time trends instead of group-specific year fixed effects.
To the extent that telemedicine allows specialists located in more urban areas to treat patients located in less urban areas, we might expect to see larger effects on patients in less urban areas. Other factors such as internet access or insurance coverage, on the other hand, would suggest that residents in nonmetropolitan area likely receive fewer benefits from telemedicine. 6 Taking the estimates in Table 6 conservatively, the most consistent evidence of mortality reduction occurs in large fringe metro counties (i.e., suburban areas) for diabetes and ischemic heart disease (Panel B). Residents in these areas also have the lowest mortality rates to begin with. We find some evidence of mortality reduction for ischemic heart disease in medium and small metro areas (Panel C), and for diabetes mellitus in nonmetropolitan areas (Panel D). Estimated effects for large central metro areas (Panel A) are smaller in general. Overall, the subarea analysis results in Table 4 suggest differences in the laws' effects based on urbanization and that most effects occur in suburban areas.
Finally, we turn to the results on hospital utilizations, displayed in Table 7 . We study four measures of utilizations using data from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey: the hospital admission rate per 1,000 population, emergency room visits per 1,000 population, hospital inpatient days per 1,000 population, and hospital outpatient visits per 1,000 population. We estimate state-year level difference-in-differences regressions because of the level of data provided in the survey. Moreover, because the last year of hospitalrelated data is 2015, we exclude Missouri and Montana (two states with parity laws passed in 2014) to be consistent with our sample restriction of including at least three post-policy years.
Most of the point estimates in Table 7 are negative, suggesting that passing parity laws are associated with reduced hospital utilization. One possibility is that resi- dents in treated states used fewer hospital services because their health is better managed. Alternatively, one might view that they replace some direct face-to-face services with telemedicine services. We interpret such results as auxiliary evidence supporting the claim that telemedicine laws have measurable impacts on mortality rates.
Conclusion
State telemedicine parity laws require private insurance plans to cover telemedicine services, in some cases at similar or no-higher rates than in-person treatments. These laws potentially expand access to specialists, particularly in less urban areas. We estimate the effect of these laws on mortality rates by cause using a difference-in-differences design. We evaluate the validity of the estimates through event studies and a variety of specification checks.
We find that, if anything, mortality rates decline following the adoption of telemedicine parity laws. Deaths due to ischemic heart disease and diabetes mellitus exhibit declines under most specifications. Declines appear largest in the fringes of large metropolitan areas, consistent with the manifestation of the causal mechanism.
Many states continue to introduce with legislation regarding telemedicine; regulations regarding telemedicine for Medicare and Medicaid plans continue to be debated. These findings suggest that laws requiring coverage of telemedicine likely expand access to telemedicine services, reducing mortality. Tables   Table 1: Notes: Sample is limited to any county that had at least 10 deaths for selected causes of death in any sample year (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) . Observations are at the county-year level. Means are weighted by county population in given year. "Selected treated states" includes counties in states that satisfied the selection criteria presented in Table 1 . Mortality rates are from the CDC WONDER system. County unemployment rate come from the Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Median household income and poverty rate come from Census Bureau's Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE). Population density and provider information come from the Area Health Resources Files (AHRF). All other variables are from Decennial Censuses (2000 and 2010) and the 5-year American Community Survey Estimates (ACS, 2006 (ACS, -2010 (ACS, , and 2011 (ACS, -2015 . Missing values in variables from the AHRF and Census are linearly interpolated at the county-year level. Notes: Sample is limited to 14 ever-treated states that have passed parity laws between 1999 and 2014 and twenty-one never treated states. Observations are at the county-year level. Included counties had at least 10 deaths for selected causes of death in any sample year (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . All regressions are weighted by county population, and control for county fixed effects, year fixed effects (differed by treated and control states), and time-varying county-level covariates (number of total active MDs per 100,000 county population, unemployment rate, median household income, median age, percent black, percent white, percent female, percent BA degree, percent high school or less 
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